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Abstract 
The native forests of Western Australia (WA) have long been the subject of heated debate between policy 
makers, conservationists and the timber industry.  A critical element of the forest dispute has been the 
issue of public input into the political decision-making processes responsible for forest policy.  Over the 
last 40 years, there has been a growth in the demands by the public for active involvement in decisions on 
nature conservation in WA, which were largely met by a resistant and at times hostile political apparatus. In 
this context, this paper offers an analysis of the participatory nature of WA’s Regional Forest Agreement 
(RFA) process during the late 1990s, a federal government initiative aimed at resolving the nation-wide 
forest dispute. WA RFA stakeholders’ perceptions of the inclusiveness of the process are presented for the 
purpose of providing (a) a gauge for the extent to which community demands for participation were 
enabled and (b) an assessment of whether WA’s RFA process qualifies as an example of good governance.  
The findings point toward a systemic failure in the management of the Western Australian RFA, for the 
process constrained opportunities for stakeholder input and deliberation-based decision-making.  In this 
context, the authors highlight the need for an opening of political structures and processes to enable and 
facilitate active stakeholder participation. 
Introduction 
Any review of the history of the Australian forest policy will refer to a conflict and 
processes best described as messy, complex and acrimonious (e.g., Chindarsi 1997; 
Dargavel 1998).  The conflict over native forests in Australia represents a clash between 
forest conservation and production agendas that have been colliding since the late 1960s 
with the onset of the industrialisation of Australian native forests. All political attempts 
in the past failed to resolve the debate and at times even increased the polarisation 
between the various protagonists (Dargavel 1998).  Government intervention often 
occurred in an ad hoc fashion, frequently lacking an understanding of the symbolic and 
ideological factors involved in forest disputes (Syme 1992; Lane 1999) and subsequently 
missing the mark in political and social acceptability. These interventions are described as 
participatory rituals (Mercer 1995) for they tended to ignore the views of the public and 
provided insufficient stakeholder access to the political decision-making processes. 
 
In the early 1990s, the National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992) promised an end to the national stalemate in the forest debate.   Regional 
Forest Agreements (RFAs), the intended vehicles for the operationalisation of the NFPS, 
were meant to deliver a balance between timber interests and conservation demands.  In 
terms of public access, these agreements were purported to be different from past 
processes with both federal and state governments emphasising their inclusiveness and 
accessibility (see Commonwealth of Australia 1992; Commonwealth of Australia and 
Government of Western Australia 1996; Forests Taskforce 1996, 1997).  Indeed, it was 
stressed that effective community involvement was regarded as important and critical to 
both the successful completion of RFAs and the durability of their outcomes.  This 






opportunity to be actively involved in the development of forest policy in their region 
(Coakes and Fenton 2001).  
 
In light of this self-confessed recognition by governments of the importance of 
meaningful public input into environmental policy processes, this paper presents the 
results of a case study investigation into the RFA experience of Western Australia (WA).  
RFA stakeholders’ perceptions of the public participation component of WA’s RFA 
process are presented with a view to assess its accessibility and inclusiveness.  The data 
are presented and discussed against the background of principles developed for good 
governance and good community involvement, shedding light on the participative nature 
of this policy process.   
 
Prior to the presentation of the RFA case study, an overview is presented of the 
contemporary literature on public participation and governance.  This review provides 
the basis for an analytical framework adopted for the assessment of WA’s RFA process.  
Public Participation and Good Governance 
Active citizen participation in environmental decision-making is a widely accepted 
notion, at least among theorists (see for instance Kemp 1985; Renn, Webler, and 
Wiedemann 1995; Buchy, Hoverman, and Averill 1999; Tuler and Webler 1999; Buchy 
and Race 2001; McCool and Guthrie 2001).  Within the public policy arena there is a 
growing recognition of the importance of governments’ responsiveness to community 
demands, showing signs of a seemingly forgotten awareness that public participation is 
integral to democratic life.  While some commentators warn of high associated costs (see 
for instance Davis 1996) or the inability of the masses to participate meaningfully 
(Schumpeter 1976), most writers in the field agree that more is seemingly better, implying 
that higher degrees of community involvement will generally lead to better outcomes.  
Positive outcomes may include improvements for the communities involved (Munro-
Clarke 1992) as well as improvements for resource use and management practices or 
community-government relations (Buchy and Race 2001).   
 
In light of the perceived benefits of public engagement numerous step-by-step guides for 
community involvement have been developed over the years, spelling out the key 
ingredients for successful participation processes and formulating ‘better’ practice 
principles (e.g. Cullen 1977; Institute for Participatory Planning (IPP) 1981; Renn et al. 
1995; Davis 1996; Buchy et al. 1999; Tuler and Webler 1999; Office of Consumer and 
Public Involvement 2000; Buchy and Race 2001; Carson and Gelber 2001; McCool and 
Guthrie 2001). Common to guidelines for community engagement are recommendations 
concerned with the blurring (dispersal) of power and responsibility, a shift away from 
government and passive compliance and to stakeholder self-determination. The 
contemporary literature speaks of a widening of the basis of power and participatory 
deliberation based on open and collectively engaged decision-making.   
 
It is also recognised that the formulaic operationalisation of ‘better’ practice protocols 
can yield counterproductive and often costly outcomes.  Indeed, practitioners are being 
cautioned to take into account a range of contextual factors which may affect otherwise 
well-designed processes (Syme 1992; Buchy and Race 2001).  In other words, process 
success is not only technique-dependent but also, perhaps predominantly, subject to 






this regard also refers to the issue governance and the very nature of the administrative 
workings of representative democracies.  Governance forms a part of the wider context 
that affects the degree to which public participation can occur (see Buchy and Race 2001) 
and is therefore a critical element of successful community participation. 
 
Governance, in broad terms, refers to all forms of producing and guiding social order 
(Börzel and Risse 2005),  describing the status of the relationships and interactions 
between governments and other social institutions (United Nations Development 
Programme 1997b; Graham, Amos, and Plumptre 2003).  This includes the processes 
and mechanisms through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their rights and obligations and mediate their differences (United Nations Development 
Programme 1997b). Contemporary debates in the governance literature are reflective of  
growing calls for stronger civil engagement in decision-making processes and more 
cooperative models in government-society relations (Mayntz 2004).  Unsurprisingly, the 
better or fair engagement of the wider community in policy-making is increasingly 
regarded as a form of ‘good’ governance (Boedeltje and Cornips 2004). 
 
Good governance is based on the core elements of democracy, which include access, 
accountability, transparency and responsiveness in political processes (Peterson and 
O'Toole 2001 cited in Thompson and Pforr 2005). As perceived by O'Riordan and Stoll-
Kleemann (2002), good governance is a shared, systems thinking approach that embraces 
openness on issues such as leadership, problem specification, and process design. This 
form of governance is characterised by the collective negotiation of the basis for action 
along agreed process parameters. Collective deliberation is based on inclusion and 
openness, enabling the pooling of mental resources, ideals, and forms of knowledge.   In 
short, good governance provides spaces in which open, reciprocal learning and network 
building can occur between governments and their citizenry, aiding collective capacity 
building and the negotiation of just and sustainable outcomes. It becomes apparent that 
active community input is an integral component of good governance, which at the same 
time is a prerequisite for meaningful public participation (United Nations Development 
Programme 1997a; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2001).  
 
The shared, systems thinking governance approach will form the background against 
which WA’s RFA process is assessed. For the application of this governance approach to 
the case of the RFA this paper adopts a selection of ‘good’ process principles developed 
by McCool and Guthrie (2001), to be understood here as a measure of the 
operationalisation of good governance. The following principles are included: 
 
• Accessibility of process 
• Power to influence process and outcomes 
• Accessibility of information 
• Structural characteristics to promote constructive interactions and facilitation of 
constructive personal behaviours 
• Adequate analysis 
 
The application of these principles for the purposes of this paper is described in 






Comments on Method 
This paper is based on information derived from a broader, case study-based 
investigation into the Western Australian RFA (see Brueckner 2004).  Case study data 
were obtained through a total of 59 interviews that were conducted over a three-year 
period between 1999 and 2001. Snowball sampling (see Goodman 1961; Babbie 1992) 
was used for the selection of a wide range of research participants, which included state 
and federal politicians, RFA process managers, conservationists and timber workers as 
well as forest industry representatives, scientists, and members of the general public. The 
interview data were triangulated with RFA-related literature and media content for the 
purpose of corroborating RFA stakeholders’ perceptions of the RFA process and its 
outcomes.  
 
For the purposes of this study, a discourse-analytical approach (after Butteriss, 
Wolfenden, and Goodridge 2001) was adopted, which builds on other work done in the 
area of public policy development (see for instance Fischer and Forester 1993; Dryzek 
1997; Meppem 2000).  In search for discursive themes and patterns visual coding and 
analytic deduction were used for the analysis of the interview data. The analysis occurred 
on the sentence level with the aim (a) to minimise author intervention and the risk of 
selectiveness, (b) to enable participants to tell their story, and (c) to transfer openness and 
transparency to the reader.   
 
Chosen data fragments were partitioned into word maps, also called rhetorical landscapes 
(Butteriss et al. 2001) or environets (Myerson and Rydin 1996), by way of identifying 
emerging themes and creating more manageable data categories.  The partitioning of the 
interview data provided the basis for further questioning and analysis and allowed for the 
parenthetical presentation of the interview data, which was then complemented with, and 
compared to, data derived from relevant RFA-related literature and media content. 
 
The information provided below is a digest of themes pertaining to the participatory 
nature of WA’s RFA process. The data presented is structured along a selection of the 
process principles developed by McCool and Guthrie (2001) described previously.  The 
different perspectives of the RFA are presented in the form of a coherent meta-narrative, 
a synthesis of individual accounts of this policy process. Quotes selected from interview 
transcripts are shown in italics and inverted commas. Due to confidentiality constraints, 
however, individual RFA stakeholders are not identified, and only broad indications are 
given of stakeholders’ backgrounds and affiliations. 
 
The following, prior to the presentation of the RFA case study data, provides 
background information on Australia’s national forest policy approach, which will help 
contextualise the forest conflict in WA and its culmination in WA’s RFA process. 
Background to Western Australia’s Regional Forest Agreement Process 
The forest conflict in WA mirrored an equally acerbic forest debate at the national level, 
which reached its zenith in the early 1990s. At the heart of the conflict were calls by 
conservationists for the reduction of the rate of commercial timber extraction, the 
cessation of woodchipping of native forests and an end to the practice of old growth 
forest logging.  The timber industry, in contrast, was arguing for greater resource security 






crisis a new national forest policy platform was born, which was to determine forest use 
and conservation in delineated forest areas around the country including WA.   
 
The National Forest Policy Statement (Commonwealth of Australia 1992) heralded a 
new approach to the conservation and development in Australia’s native forests.   The 
NFPS spoke of conflict resolution and certainty for all stakeholders via improved forest 
reserve systems, industry competitiveness and ecologically sustainable forest management 
practices.  RFAs were meant to be the vehicles for the realisation of the new forest 
policy. They represented individual, 20-year-long agreements entered into by the 
Commonwealth and States and Territory Governments, which sought to regulate native 
forest use, conservation and management.   
 
Comprehensive Regional Assessments (CRAs) formed the basis for RFA negotiations 
between the Commonwealth and state governments. These assessments were intended to 
coalesce  new and existing information about the natural, cultural, economic and social 
values of the forest areas covered under RFAs (Coakes 1998).  Data collection, 
integration and assessment were coordinated jointly by Commonwealth and state 
government agencies, bringing together for the first time a range of traditionally disparate 
policy portfolios (e.g., Forest Task Force of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (PM&C), Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Australia (former Department of 
Primary Industries and Energy) and Environment Australia (EA)).  This joint effort 
represented a new approach to inter-departmental collaboration (Coakes and Fenton 
2001) and was regarded a significant advance in policy-making technique (Stewart and 
Jones 2003).  
 
RFAs also incorporated a new approach to stakeholder participation. The RFA formula 
promised explicitly, in contrast to past policy processes, “extensive public consultation” 
and to “enable the community to make … considered contribution[s] within the land use 
decision-making process and to forest management issues” (Commonwealth of Australia 
1992: 38).   Indeed, during WA’s RFA process (1997-1999) the public was consulted 
through a wide range of mechanisms, including RFA-related research reports and 
information kits, an information line, a video and newsletters, fortnightly RFA updates 
published in the state’s daily newspaper as well as local papers and a RFA internet 
website.  In addition, three consultative reference groups were formed, community 
heritage workshops and public meetings were convened, and surveys and interviews were 
conducted as part of the RFA’s social assessment component (see Social Assessment 
Unit 1998, 1999).1,2 
 
Despite these mechanisms, the participative nature of WA’s RFA process was criticised 
by various RFA stakeholder groups.  In fact, when WA’s RFA was signed in May 1999 it 
triggered immense public hostility towards the outcomes reached.  It was felt widely that 




1 For a detailed description of the WA RFA process refer to Stewart and Jones (2003) or Worth (2004). 
2 It was the first time that a national policy process of this kind incorporated social assessments.  Yet, while 
social assessments formed a part of the WA RFA process, they fall outside a broader discussion on the 
participatory nature of RFAs.  For an overview and critique of the social assessment component of the 






the RFA document did not reflect the wishes of the community and that decision-makers 
were ignorant of the public’s views towards forest use and protection. In response to 
public pressure the WA state government repudiated the original RFA only eight weeks 
after the agreement had been signed. Furthermore, at the state election in early 2001 the 
government lost office, arguably in part because of the public reaction to the RFA. 
 
In toto, the forest conflict in WA had not been resolved by the RFA; instead the venom 
in the forest debate was increased.  Despite the rhetoric of conflict resolution and 
community involvement WA’s RFA seemingly failed to provide a process and deliver 
outcomes that were acceptable to RFA stakeholders.  This paper takes issue with the 
notion of process failure as it relates to community engagement, and  the case study data 
presented below will shed light onto the reasons underlying the negative response to 
WA’s RFA process and its outcomes. 
Stakeholder Perceptions of the Regional Forest Agreement 
Access ibi l i ty  o f  Process 
In relation to the accessibility of the RFA process, it was the level or quality of access 
that proved to be contentious.  RFA stakeholders were invited to participate via public 
meetings, submissions, and what was called the Stakeholder Reference Group (SRG). 
The SRG was a consultative forum designed to advise the RFA Steering Committee 
which was staffed with bureaucrats from both the WA and the Commonwealth 
government and in charge of overseeing the RFA process.  Essentially anyone – as a 
member of a registered organisation - could be signed up with the SRG, and individuals 
were free to attend public meetings. According to RFA process management, making 
available these participation options to members of the public meant that “everybody [would 
get] a fair go.”  However, the SRG was widely regarded as irrelevant to the process.  This is 
because many stakeholders, especially environment groups, sought access to the actual 
decision-making process for they viewed the SRG as a mere “Mickey Mouse Committee of 
everybody from the prospectors to anyone who was nominated.”  As a consequence, many 
environment groups attempted to gain access to the RFA Steering Committee. Yet, when 
the State and the Commonwealth government “formed the Steering Committee …” it seemed 
that they “left conservationists out of it”, which in turn meant that “conservation groups boycotted 
the RFA process because they believed that they ought to have been on the Steering Committee itself.”  
 
Access in terms of timing, location and advertising of meetings was also reflected on 
poorly.  Many stakeholders felt that “the publicity [given to meetings] was not good” and that 
“there was inadequate lead-time given” because stakeholders “would get notice at the last moment.”  
Although most public meetings were held in the state’s south-west, many SRG meetings 
were held in the state capital.  This inconvenienced many SRG members who were living 
in the southern parts of the RFA area; especially, in view of meetings being postponed or 
cancelled at short or – on occasion – no notice (e.g., “There was no real effort, even though we 
as stakeholders had raised in the meetings that they needed to give at least one month notice for people to 
be able to put it in their diaries and arrange absence from work”; “they would basically invite everyone 
up from the south-west for a key-stakeholders meeting and then 24 hours beforehand cancel it”). 
 
Complaints were also common about the perceived haste with which the process 
progressed as “things were really rushed” and “meetings were called … at too short a notice.” This 






… [because they were] being rushed too much.” Moreover, the “apparent rush and pressure on to get 
it all over and done with … actually constrain[ed] the process” and in the eyes of many RFA 
stakeholders seemed to “provide or legitimise the whole argument that we don’t have time to have 
broad-scale community consultation.” 
Power to Inf luence Process  and Outcomes 
The effectiveness of stakeholder input via the SRG was considered very limited in light 
of widespread perceptions it was run by “a government that [was] very much top-down” and 
therefore “never going to be the actual place where major decisions were made.” In other words, the 
SRG was not believed to be a truly participatory or effective forum in terms of affecting 
process outcomes. In particular, local council and environmental group members felt 
that “they did not have ownership of it” and that the whole process was “a terrific example of 
disempowerment.”  Their concerns were related to decision-making, being listened to, and 
having an impact on the final outcome.  In this context, it was felt that “it was always talk-
down: You sit down, and we will tell you, and you listen”, which in the view of many 
stakeholders explained in the end why “the public rebelled against … [the RFA] … because they 
were not part of the decision-making process.”  In contrast, process managers saw RFA 
stakeholder input as meaningful because in their view “all issues raised [by stakeholders] were 
considered and discussed.” Moreover, stakeholders were believed to have had an impact on 
the final RFA outcomes because government negotiators “actually moved green [toward the 
conservation agenda] because of those people who actually did participate in the debate.” 
 
During the public comment period when members of the public were asked to respond 
to the RFA Public Consultation Paper, more than 30 000 submissions were lodged with 
the authorities; an unprecedented number of public responses in WA.  A large number of 
interest groups voiced their concerns about a range of process-related aspects as well as 
the choice of, and scientific basis for, reserve and forest use options proposed for 
adoption (see for instance Baile et al. 1998). The Consultation Paper was criticised for it 
was felt that “there was little evidence of public input” into the options presented, fuelling 
perceptions that the RFA was “totally controlled … by the timber industry.” Public agitation 
was aggravated further as “there was no admission [by RFA management] that the vast majority of 
submissions on the RFA were opposed to what the RFA was suggesting.”  Consequently, when the 
RFA was finalised by the Commonwealth and WA state government in May 1999, many 
stakeholders saw in it a policy document that “demonstrate[d] an incredible level of indifference 
towards community involvement and community participation and community concerns” (e.g., “… what 
you are saying to the community is: get stuffed, basically”).  
Access ibi l i ty  o f  Information 
In terms of access to published information, RFA process managers believed they had 
informed the public more than adequately since the “information … provided to the public, 
both the assessment information and all the other information, [was] much greater than you would have 
in most other government processes.” There were only admissions to occasional delays in the 
publication process (e.g., “Some of the data did not get out as early as we would have liked but we 
made a choice that it was better to get out sufficient data rather than to get out something that was really 
half-baked earlier”).   
 
While stakeholders acknowledged that data were being made available, disquiet arose 






moment”), the type of information (e.g., “… the information that the Commonwealth officers had 
that might therefore be in the public domain was very, very tightly controlled as well and limited”), and 
the quality of the data (e.g., ”the public as a whole and other institutions never really had an entry 
into the debate because of the quality of the information available to them”).  Furthermore, there 
were questions about the data sources and the way information came together as “the 
public did not get an opportunity to actually see how all of the information that came out of the working 
groups and the technical groups and the public comment on the options paper had been addressed until 
they were given a document, which says that it has been signed.”   Among stakeholders, including 
industry representatives, there was a strong sense that data publication was poor, not just 
to the general public but to SRG members especially (e.g., “[Stakeholders] did not get proper 
access to information”; “The Stakeholder Group … [did] not have … access to all of the information”).  
Similar concerns were raised in connection with the type of data that was made available.  
Stakeholders felt that the published information was of limited usefulness because of 
concerns about accuracy and the format in which it was presented (e.g., “the material we 
had presented to us was very difficult for the layperson to understand because of gaps and imprecision in 
the materials”; “After a session with these people you had to say that that is not right.  Straight away 
you got a doubt about what the other information is like”).  
Structural  Character i s t i c s  to  Promote Construct ive  Interact ions and Faci l i tat ion o f  
Construct ive  Personal  Behaviours  
The words “haste”, “marginalisation”, “battle”, “arrogance”, and “distrust” were used by a wide 
range of RFA stakeholders when describing the perceived structural (and here mainly 
behavioural) characteristics of the RFA process.  Most stakeholders acknowledged a 
pervasive hostility in the debate, which was partly seen to be historical (e.g., “No other 
environmental issue has caused so much conflict and divisiveness in the community as the forest issue in 
Australia’s history”).  The resulting angst and frustration was fuelled by the way 
stakeholders, SRG members in particular, felt treated throughout the process.  It was 
held that stakeholders “were basically just being insulted by this process.” In fact, stakeholders 
felt that “the process was so perverted that … [they] actually made a complaint to the Ombudsman”, 
indicating that “[people] got angrier and angrier … as the process went on.” 
 
Perhaps most importantly, integral to the acrimonious nature of the RFA process was the 
Western Australian lead agency in the RFA process, namely the Department of 
Conservation and Land Management (CALM) (e.g., “there was distrust in WA about 
CALM’s processes”). Since CALM’s formation in 1985, there has been growing criticism 
toward the department because of perceptions of a conflict of interest over its 
responsibilities for both forest production and conservation.  In addition, controversy 
arose over allegations of departmental corruption and scientific censorship within the 
agency (Lowe 1993; Schultz 1993; Schoombee 1998; Churches 2000).  This almost 
historical sense of distrust was echoed by RFA stakeholders who voiced “concern that 
CALM were going to take the foreshadowed process and do the same thing to the process like they had 
done to a number of other processes to do with the forests”.  Stakeholders’ concerns, however, were 
also directly related to CALM’s role in the RFA process, as it was seen to be the 
department that “definitely dominated” and “drove the process.”  In particular, the “methodology 
used by CALM - the way in which some of the CALM people managed themselves in public meetings” 
- was viewed, in part, to have been “what discredited the RFA” in that it “only served to … 
heighten the distrust.” Overall, CALM’s engagement with the community during the RFA 








RFA process managers maintained that stakeholder meetings were “civilised”, perhaps 
“regimented but fair.”  Also, stakeholders conceded that both “CALM staff” and “federal 
representatives … [as well as] the state representatives were very professional.” Still, it was 
emphasised that there “was no trust in the process” as people felt that they “have been misled 
about things” and that it was a “very unfair process”; and in particular, “the level of distrust of 
CALM, whether it is warranted or not, was at such a high level” that the “summary was a vote of no 
confidence in the RFA process.” 
Adequate Analys is  
It was part of the RFA rhetoric that the process was based on science, and both federal 
and state governments seemed to believe that “science was always going to be the critical element 
in terms of what [the RFA] was going to achieve.”  While it was accepted - in part quite 
cynically - (e.g., “science and scientists were used to validate a political process”) that many 
scientists were involved in the process there was controversy relating to the actual 
number of scientists involved and who they were working for (e.g., “there were a lot of 
scientists involved, 490 I think”; “500 scientists and experts … let’s have their names … [they] came 
up with 220 and 89 per cent or 80 per cent of them work for CALM”).  Here, the centrality of 
CALM proved divisive as there was a fairly high level of distrust in the public arena 
about whether CALM was being totally open and whether the department was allowing 
its scientists to be totally open in their scientific findings (e.g., “many forest biologists in WA 
were either employed by CALM and therefore not free to speak up or were at university and wimps and 
would not speak up”; “It was all done in-house”).  
 
The interview data attest to considerable public uncertainty and doubt relating to the 
quality of scientific work undertaken for the Comprehensive Regional Assessment that 
formed the basis for the RFA negotiations.  This was because of perceptions that “figures 
[were] fudged and massaged”, that “some of the data was being chopped to pieces” and that “the 
database [was] fundamentally flawed”; all amounting to the view that “there was … some 
incredibly shonky science” (e.g., “there are not too many scientists who will say best science.  They will 
say RFA science very disparagingly”).   
 
Concerns were also expressed by members of the scientific community regarding the 
scope and timelines given for the assessment work (e.g., “there was no scope to go and acquire 
additional data which I think was fundamentally required”; “the time aspect was utterly inadequate”), 
the review process (e.g., “it was a higgledy-piggledy mess in terms of process, about how these reports 
were going to be dealt with, how they were going to be reviewed, how they were going to be assessed and 
handled”), and the quality of the scientific data sets used for the RFA process (e.g., 
“conclusions are extremely suspect in the sense that they are based on inadequate data”; “there was no 
real effort made to ensure that the outcomes from any scientific process, especially those processes that were 
done outside of CALM, were the best available”). 
 
While there was agreement that the resourcing of the scientific work was adequate (e.g., 
“the funding was adequate”) and an acknowledgement of some good scientific work by 
process participants (e.g., “there was some good stuff [science] in the WA RFA”), a considerable 
number of process participants reached the conclusion that “the involvement of the scientific 
community was an absolute farce”, that “at the end the scientific side was lost”, and that “this RFA 







Whilst recognising the impact of time constraints (e.g., “there are obvious limitations to what 
can be done within the timeframe”), RFA process management countered the above 
assertions, stating categorically that the RFA was “a scientific process” and that the 
Comprehensive Regional Assessment in WA “…was a very sound process.”  Moreover, it 
was argued that “the majority of … [scientific] reports were actually peer-reviewed”, that “scientific 
data was being examined by Commonwealth and state governments before it was going to the Steering 
Committee, and [that] … certainly quite a lot effort … went into checking data.”  Also, assurances 
were given that the “assessment work was done in a very scientific manner” and that the science 
of WA’s RFA “put Western Australia in a very strong position in terms of protection of … 
biodiversity” in the future.  There was an admission that the science might have “been lost in 
the debate”, but it was stressed that “it [was] there, that it [was] underlying.” 3 
Discussion 
The data presented above reveals a fairly dichotomous discourse environment with RFA 
stakeholders by and large demonising the process (e.g., “the process was so perverted”; “[we 
were] massaged into believing that what the RFA was offering was the very best outcome”) and both 
governments with their respective departments defending the process as having been 
appropriate (e.g., “huge amount of public consultation”; “We did our best to adapt that consultation 
to what people were saying they wanted it to be”). On the whole, RFA stakeholders generally felt 
poorly informed throughout the process, not listened to, marginalised, and excluded 
from the actual decision-making. Stakeholder responses signalled a lack of ownership and 
a distinct lack of trust. 
 
Stakeholder discontentment with the RFA process and its outcomes can be explained in 
light of the government rhetoric employed prior to the commencement of WA’s RFA 
process.  Both  the National Forest Policy Statement (Commonwealth of Australia 1992)  
and the WA Scoping Agreement (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of 
Western Australia 1996) spoke of active community engagement and involvement in the 
determination of policy direction.  While the RFA process employed instruments of 
community consultation and communication, active participation was disallowed.  It 
could therefore be argued that stakeholders were justified in thinking that the process did 
not deliver on its promises. 
 
This form of limiting community involvement, however, appears to be common 
government practice, a point attested to by a senior civil servant: “… consultation … that 
could be just simply putting out a report to the public and receiving written submissions.  I mean that’s 
the minimum that would be required to meet the public consultation guidelines or the term public 
consultation.”  Thus, it seems only consistent that stakeholder input was restricted to a 
Stakeholder Reference Group, public meetings, and invited public comments.  In short, 
active stakeholder participation as understood within the context of good governance 
would have gone far beyond standard government procedure. The question arises, 
however, whether the decision to consult as opposed to enable active participation was 
adequate (prudent) given (a) the widespread acknowledgement of the generally tokenistic  




3 For a more detailed analysis and critique of the science of the WA RFA refer to Horwitz and Calver 






nature of strictly consultative processes (Arnstein 1969), (b) the proven benefits of co-
operation and active participation (see for instance, Renn 1992; Laird 1993; Webler 1995; 
Moore 1996), (c) the promises made in the lead-up to WA’s RFA (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992; Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia 
1996), and (d) the stakes in, and the context of, the (Western) Australian forest debate.   
 
On the questions of success or failure, Buchy and Race. (2001: 16) assert that “it is 
impossible to answer categorically whether participation is successful or not as this 
judgement depends on the definition of ‘success’ and is very much linked to the purpose 
of participation in the first place.”  The point here is that WA’s RFA process was 
seemingly lacking precisely that definitional clarity or what Moore (1996) calls a ‘shared 
understanding of success’. In other words, the evaluation of success was not negotiated 
between process managers and stakeholders.  In general, RFA process management 
envisaged an ‘instrumental’ role for process participants while RFA stakeholders seemed 
to aspire to play an integral part in what they perceived to be a ‘transformative’ process, 
meaning an avenue to accomplish their particular ends founded on what they thought the 
process would deliver (after Buchy and Race 2001).  Such transformative powers, 
however, were vested with process managers and political decision makers.  In that 
regard one can speak of process failure as process success per se was poorly defined, and 
its official definition was neither shared nor sufficiently communicated (e.g., “the majority 
of the public wanted something significantly different to that set out by the RFAs to achieve”).  This 
indicates that, in relation to community input, the objectives of the RFA against which its 
success can be measured were not widely understood or shared.  It was these 
misperceptions that in the end only served to aggravate already existing tensions between 
process management and the RFA stakeholder community. 
 
The case study findings suggest that public participation was insufficiently enabled when 
gauged in light of the process principles adopted for the purposes of this paper.  In light 
of the interview data, a merely tokenistic role was permitted to RFA stakeholders 
throughout the process.  A lack of transparency and information sharing, restrictive 
communication flows, and stakeholders’ disconnectedness from the decision-making 
processes were shown to have been responsible for stakeholders’ dissatisfaction with the 
RFA process.  The interview data point toward the exclusion/marginalisation of 
stakeholders whose involvement was believed to have been constrained by decisions 
regarding, inter alia, problem specifications and process management as well as 
stakeholder consultation, the use of science and others. The separation of stakeholders 
from these aspects of the process precluded an interactive learning between RFA 
management and stakeholders and thus impaired adaptive planning and limited 
opportunities for transformational change.  The problems associated with these 
limitations became evident in the stakeholders’ reactions to the process and their 
rejection of the process outcomes. Overall, this communication failure meant that 
divergent expectations on the process could not be relayed effectively throughout the 
process, which in the end resulted in both sides of the process, seen in the RFA 
management-stakeholder dichotomy, blaming each other for not having understood what 
the process was about. 
 
Although the rhetoric of the RFA gave the impression of empowerment and shared 
governance, the process was reflective of programmed governance, hierarchical in 






represents an approach that O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann (2002) liken to the practical 
problem-solving paradigm, the governance model of the twentieth century.  This 
governance model is based on exclusion and power concentration, it is short-termed and 
quick-fix orientated and prone to unintended consequences that give rise to complexity, 
uncertainty and injustice.  It is resistant to stakeholder input, exhibiting a form of 
resilience to external change, as decisions on problem definition, process design or 
process leadership remain in the domain of a narrow policy community.  This system 
does not facilitate or encourage the education of stakeholders but rather seeks to control 
information, resulting in an unhealthy relationship between the governing and the 
governed, as excessive control breeds distrust.   
 
As was shown in the case of WA’s RFA, trust is decisive in political processes and indeed 
a critical condition for good governance.  As suggested by O'Riordan and Stoll-
Kleemann (2002: 100), participants in political processes “have to enter on the basis of 
trust in the processes in which they are operating, and in the spirit of reaching an 
outcome that is fairly and respectfully arrived at.” It is trust that gives legitimacy to 
political processes, and it is therefore essential in public affairs and processes such as the 
RFA.  However, this form of (active) trust has to be actively produced and negotiated 
(Giddens 1994).  Active trust develops from a background level of trust culture 
dependent on a structural context (e.g.,  transparency of government processes) and so-
called agential endowment (e.g., social moods and collective capital) (Sztompka 1999 
cited in Marks and Zadoroznyj 2002).  Thus, trust is evolutionary and requires time and 
process. 
 
The WA RFA case study data attest that in terms of both structural context and agential 
endowment little scope existed for the development of trust among the negotiating 
parties. The decision-making structures of the RFA were closed, severely limiting 
stakeholders’ ability to influence the process outcomes.  Furthermore, a strong sense of 
distrust existed already prior to the commencement of WA’s RFA process, adding to the 
difficulty of trust development. In other words, the absence of trust and the failure to 
engage in processes of active trust negotiation between RFA management and RFA 
stakeholders meant that the RFA was bound to face a legitimacy crisis due to a lack of 
public acceptability.  This also leads to the conclusion that trust is the outcome of, and 
prerequisite for, good governance as it provides the platform for the meaningful 
engagement of the community in political processes. In contrast, the absence of trust is a 
characteristic of processes with constrained public participation and thus a key obstacle 
to good governance and enduring environmental policy-making. 
 
Concluding Comments 
The case study data presented in this paper point towards the failure of WA’s RFA 
process. Stakeholders’ perceived process realities illustrated that, despite the promising 
RFA rhetoric, WA’s RFA process violated principles of good governance. 
 
In light of the case study data and the literature reviewed, it can be suggested that 
environmental policy-making in Australia would benefit from the adoption of 
deliberation-based and open decision-making processes.  Processes such as these would 
lead to a dispersal of power and responsibility and would aid the shift away from 






transitions are unlikely to take place in the face of unchanged decision-making structures 
and entrenched power differentials.  Any attempt to change traditional patterns of 
decision-making or entrenched structures of thought and governance, ultimately relies on 
the relinquishment of power.  Active participation and good governance are dependent 
on education and active enabling and assistance, fundamental to which is a genuine 
willingness of those who hold power for this to occur.  Yet, as exemplified by WA’s 
RFA, current political and bureaucratic structures derived from closed and opaque 
politico-economic entanglements seemingly prove too resilient to enable such a shift.  
 
The application of good governance principles in this paper helped identify the closed 
nature of WA’s RFA process and explain its failure in terms of lacking social 
acceptability.  The concept of good governance may therefore also prove to be a useful 
lens through which to plan and analyse future environmental policy processes in 
Australia.  An approach such as this may help isolate process aspects prone to public 
rejection and thus reduce the potential for environmental policy conflicts. 
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